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1. Introduction 
On April 22nd of 2018, the Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega announced that he would 
cancel his plans of social security reform, after days of heavy protest (Feingold, 2018). This is 
certainly not a unique occurrence. In the current era of welfare state retrenchment, social 
movements protesting against this development arise frequently. As was illustrated by 
president Ortega’s announcement, these attempts can be successful. Yet in many other cases, 
they are not (Burnstein & Linton, 2002). However, the question what constitutes the 
difference between these successful and unsuccessful movements has not yet been answered. 
This is what this thesis attempts to do. By analyzing four cases of social movements 
protesting welfare state cuts, this thesis tries to answer the question:  
  
 “What determines whether social movements resisting cuts to welfare state  
 programs are successful?”  
 
The cases that are examined are the 1995 French strikes against the Juppé plan, the 2008 Irish 
medical cards protests, the 2011 British anti-austerity protests and the 2014 Belgian anti-
austerity protests. These four cases are compared on the basis of several potential explanatory 
factors, that are derived from the existing literature. Through this comparison these factors are 
analyzed.  
 
This study fills a gap in the literature concerning the explanation of the success of some social 
movements resisting cuts to welfare state programs and the failure of others. No earlier 
studies have specifically answered this question, by looking at a range of potential 
explanatory factors. This enhanced knowledge about the influence of social movements also 
increases the public knowledge about extra-parliamentary processes on policy making. This 
contributes to the transparency of the political process.   
 
This thesis will start with a brief evaluation of the existing literature on the welfare state and 
social movements. Consequently, the theoretical expectations, that are examined in this thesis, 
will be presented. Thereafter, the used research methods, case selection and used concepts 
will be explained. After this, the selected cases will be examined and analyzed. Finally, the 
conclusion will provide an answer to the research question.  
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   2.  Literature review  
 
Since the last decades of the 20th century a considerable amount of research has been 
conducted on the impact of social movements on political decisions. In this literature review, 
factors influencing the success of social movements as identified by different authors will be 
presented. Subsequently, it will be argued that a gap in the literature exists concerning social 
movements who resist welfare state cuts and the most important contributions scholars have 
made in this field will be presented. The literature review is somewhat brief, since a great deal 
of the relevant literature is discussed in the theoretical framework. 
 
2.1 Welfare state retrenchment  
From the 1970’s on, welfare state retrenchment has occurred in many countries in the western 
world. This development has also been accompanied by an increase in scholarly interest in the 
subject. One example of this is Pierson (1994), who studied the concept by looking at welfare 
retrenchment under Reagan and Thatcher. He concluded that retrenchment was more likely, 
when client groups of programs were not committed to these programs (Pierson, 1994, p. 166). 
Pierson (1994, p. 172) also emphasized the importance of compensating losses for client 
groups as a strategy for retrenchment. Such conditions make welfare state retrenchment more 
complicated than expected (Pierson, 1994).  Kitschelt’s (2001) research on showed the 
importance of party competition and party systems as an explanatory factor of welfare state 
retrenchment. The wave of austerity during the financial crisis has renewed the interest in 
welfare retrenchment. This has also resulted in new studies of the phenomenon, in which 
authors have focused on issues like the electoral consequences of retrenchment (Giger, 2010) 
and the influence of fiscal consolidation (Armingeon, Guthmann & Weisstanner, 2015).   
 
2.2 Social movements  
Analyses of what determines whether social movements are successful can roughly be divided 
between analyses that emphasize political opportunity structures and those that emphasize 
characteristics of movements themselves (Amenta, Carruthers & Zylan, 1992). The most 
important example of a political opportunity analysis is a comparative case study by Kitschelt 
(1986). He showed that anti-nuclear social movements tend to be more successful when there 
is an open political system and a strong government. Literature concerning the effect of 
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movement characteristics has focused on topics like the role of political allies (Böhm, 2015) 
and the influence of the use of violence (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). 
 
2.3 Gap in the literature  
A reasonable amount of literature exists concerning the impact of social movements and 
welfare state retrenchment. However, with respect to the anti welfare state retrenchment 
movements, there seems to be a gap in the literature concerning the determinants of their 
success. It is not clear what political contexts are favorable for these social movements and 
what characteristics increase their chances of success. Therefore, additional research on this 
topic is required. This is what this thesis provides.  
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   3.   Theoretical framework  
Some authors have mentioned factors that influence the effectiveness of social movements 
resisting cuts to welfare state programs. The arguments provided by these authors are 
analyzed to try and identify the potential explanatory factors. It is possible to formulate 
theoretical expectations about the causes of the successes and failures of social movements 
resisting cuts to welfare state programs, based on this literature and the literature on social 
movements in general. These theoretical expectations are divided into expectations related to 
political opportunity structures and expectations related to characteristics of the social 
movements. According to political mediation theory, social movements have the greatest 
chance of achieving their goals when both are favorable for them (Amenta et al., 1992, p. 
335-336).  
 
3.1 Political opportunity structures  
A number of scholars have focused on the political opportunities in explaining the success of 
resistance to welfare cuts. From their work, three important expectations can be identified. 
The first of these holds that social movements are more likely to be successful in resisting 
cuts to welfare state programs in countries where these programs are targeted at large parts of 
the population. This expectation is derived from Korpi and Palme (2003), who argued that 
chances of successful resistance differed in different types welfare states. They did not use the 
standard division of Esping-Andersen (1990), but their own division (Korpi & Palme, 1998). 
Following their theory, the expectation is that resistance is most likely to succeed in countries 
with a corporatist welfare state and least likely to succeed in countries with basic security or 
targeted welfare states (Korpi & Palme, 2003).   
 
The second theoretical expectation concerning political opportunity structures holds that 
social movements are more likely to be successful in resisting cuts to welfare state programs 
in countries with open political systems and strong governments (Kitschelt, 1986). While 
originally developed in the context of anti-nuclear movements, the expectation is that this also 
applies to social movements resisting cuts to welfare state programs. The last expectation 
holds that resistance against cuts to welfare state programs will be smaller and less successful, 
when the effects of the cuts are less direct. This expectation is based on Timonen (2001, p. 
55), whose case study on Finland and Sweden showed that public expenditure cuts were less 
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likely to cause resistance when the impact will be felt over the long term, rather than the short 
term. 
 
3.2 Social movement characteristics  
Apart from the aforementioned theoretical expectations concerning political opportunity 
structures, there are also expectations concerning the relationship between the characteristics 
of social movements resisting cuts to welfare state programs and their chances of success. 
Firstly, a movement’s chance of success is expected to increase when its ability to disrupt 
society and the movement’s size are larger (Vibe, 2011, p. 93). Stephan and Chenoweth 
(2008), however, argued that nonviolent social movements tend to be more successful, 
because violence reduces the odds that the movement would attract support from the political 
elite. Therefore, the expectation is that violence decreases social movements’ chances of 
success. Thirdly, social movements with allies in the political elite are expected to have a 
higher chance of success (Reese, 2011, p. 168; Böhm, 2015). One of the ways in which allies 
are expected to increase these chances is by translating the protesters’ critique into concrete 
proposals (Tarrow, 1993, p. 599). And finally, the expectation can be formulated that social 
movements who increase the amount of public support for their cause have higher chances of 
success (Vibe, 2011, p. 95). The total amount of public support is less relevant, since it is the 
change in public opinion that influences decision-makers (Giugni, 1998, p. 380).  
 
However, apart from these expectations based on existing literature and theories, it is assumed 
that other, yet unknown factors may play an important role in determining the chances of 
success of social movements resisting cuts to welfare state programs. This is because the 
existing literature on this topic is limited and earlier research on the influence of social 
movements has concluded that factors influencing the success of social movements vary 
between different contexts (Amenta, Caren & Chiarello, 2010, p. 296).  
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   4.  Methodology  
 
4.1 Methods and data selection  
This thesis examines several cases in which protest by social movements against cuts to 
welfare state programs took place. In order to do this in a scientific and systematic matter, a 
qualitative comparative case study is employed. This analysis is applied to four cases, based 
on a diverse cases design. These cases are examined and compared to identify whether the 
factors, that were mentioned in the existing literature, in fact influence the chances of success 
of social movements resisting welfare state retrenchment. These factors are described 
extensively in the next chapter. Additionally, this thesis investigates whether there was a 
causal link between the presence (or absence) of a certain factor and the success or failure of 
the researched social movements. This is done by analysis of various sources. These sources 
are selected systematically. Firstly, when possible, primary sources are used. These contain 
government sources and other sources, such as political parties and parliaments. If this is 
impossible or irrelevant, academic sources are searched. If this provides no useful sources 
either, the search is expanded to media articles. The used sources are selected on the basis of 
perceived reliability, objectiveness and whether they provide relevant information about the 
examined factors. The next chapter describes per factor what sources are used. Through this 
study, this thesis tries to provide a better understanding of the causes of success and failure of 
social movements resisting cuts to welfare state programs.  
 
4.2 Case selection  
The cases that have been examined in this thesis are selected to be diverse cases, as described 
by Gerring (2008). This choice has been made, because the existing literature provides many 
different possible relevant factors. By using diverse cases, the influence of many factors can 
be examined. Therefore, four cases have been selected that differ on many of the factors 
examined, such as movement size, disruptiveness, presence of political allies and the type of 
welfare state. Furthermore, these cases differ on the basis of their degrees of success. In two 
of the cases, social movements were successful in resisting cuts to welfare state programs. In 
the two remaining cases, social movements failed in their attempts to resist these cuts. This 
diverse set of cases enhances the generalizability of the study. Thus, the findings will apply to 
the wider subset of social movements resisting cuts to welfare state programs.   
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These four cases were selected, because they were better researchable, had clearer results and 
were more well-known than other potential cases. Some potential cases were less easy to 
examine, because of the lack of scientific sources and media sources available. Others 
provided the problem that most available sources were in languages the researcher does not 
master, as was, for example, the case with the Spanish ‘Indignados’ movement. Therefore, the 
following four cases have been selected.  
 
4.2.1 1995 French opposition to the Juppé plan  
In 1995, after the election of right wing president Jacques Chirac, the newly appointed prime 
minister Alain Juppé proposed the ‘Juppé Plan’ (Trat, 1996). This plan contained cuts to the 
welfare state in multiple fields of the French welfare state. In reaction to this, enormous 
strikes occurred to resist these reforms. Eventually, Juppé had to abandon parts of the plan as 
a result of the protests (Trat, 1996, p. 235). Thus, the opposition movement was successful in 
resisting parts of the Juppé Plan.  
 
4.2.2 2008 Irish medical cards protests  
In response to the Irish government’s decision to abolish the automatic entitlement to free 
health care for seniors over 70 years old, protests began in Ireland (RTE, 2008). In reaction, 
the government increased the weekly income threshold above which seniors would no longer 
be entitled to a full medical card, that ensures basic medical costs (Health Service Executive, 
2018), from €240,30 to €700 (Oireachtas, 2008a; Oireachtas, 2008b, p. 5). However, the 
principle of universal health care for seniors was revoked (Martha, 2014). Therefore, the 
outcome of the protest can be categorized as a partial success.  
 
4.2.3 2011 British anti-austerity protests  
In the coalition agreement of 2010, the coalition of the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats agreed to cuts of around 6 billion pounds in the financial year 2010/2011 
(Cameron and Clegg, 2010). In reaction, British unions called for mass protests to oppose 
these cuts (Guardian, 2011a). The protests were unsuccessful, as the government was not 
willing to change its policies (BBC, 2011b). Thus, while the protest was large in size, it was 
unsuccessful.   
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4.2.4 2014 Belgian anti-austerity protests  
Immediately after the inauguration of the Michel government in 2014 and the announcement 
of its austerity plans, Belgian unions called for strikes and protests against the announced 
budget cuts (Wouters, Walgrave, Ketelaars & Egge, 2015). However, prime minister Michel 
was not willing to yield to the demands of the unions and therefore he did not give noteworthy 
concessions to them (Mouton, 2014). So, the social movements did not succeed in stopping 
the cuts to welfare state programs.  
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   5.  Concepts and indicators  
In this chapter is described how the used concepts are conceptualized. Furthermore, the used 
indicators for these concepts are presented.  
 
5.1 Social movements  
Tarrow (1996, p. 4) defined social movements as “collective challenges, based on common 
purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and 
authorities”. Snow, Soule and Kriesi (2004, p. 11), however, used a definition that differed 
from Tarrow’s in the sense that it focused on occurring outside of institutional and 
organizational channels. But this excludes social movements in which institutionalized 
organizations, for example trade unions play a large role. Therefore, Tarrow’s broader 
definition is more compatible with the subject of this study.  
 
So, social movements engage in collective challenges (Tarrow, 1996, p. 5). Further, social 
movements have common purposes, a goal the participants share they wish to achieve through 
the movement (Tarrow, 1996, p. 5-6).  Participants also need to recognize these common 
goals and express solidarity with fellow members of the movement (Tarrow, 1996, p. 6). 
Finally, a form of contention is only considered a social movement when it is sustained over a 
longer period of time.  
 
5.2 Success of social movements  
In conceptualizing the success of social movements, Gamson (1975, p. 28) recognized two 
important dimensions in which this can be measured. The first of these is concerned with 
whether or not the movement is accepted as a spokesperson of the group it means to represent 
by the group it tries to influence. The second dimension is concerned with whether or not the 
situation of the people the movement represented was improved, which Gamson called ‘new 
advantages’ (Gamson, 1975, p. 29). Of these two dimensions, Gamson (1975, p. 29) 
prioritized acceptance over new advantages. 
 
Amenta et al. (1992, p. 310-311) have criticized Gamson’s conceptualization of social 
movements’ success. They categorized three levels of success for movements based on the 
same two dimensions. At the highest level, the movement is recognized as a “member of the 
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polity” (Amenta et al., 1992, p. 310) and the issue it is concerned with is resolved on their 
conditions. At the middle level, positive reforms are implemented without this recognition. At 
the lowest level, movements achieve recognition, but no policy change occurs. Thus, Amenta 
et al. clearly prioritized the new advantages dimension over the recognition dimension.   
 
This thesis uses Amenta et al.’s conceptualization of success of social movements. This 
choice has been made, because new advantages for the represented group (stopping the cuts) 
are more important than being included in the governmental elite, in the context of social 
movements resisting cuts to welfare state programs.   
 
The success of a social movement is operationalized by looking at the changes in the 
proposed reforms of welfare state programs as a result of the social movement’s protests. 
Whether there is a causal relationship between the changes and the social movement is 
checked by looking at the reactions of members of the government in the media. Total 
absence of success can be recognized when there are no changes in the proposals as a 
response of the social movement. Total success can be recognized by a total withdrawal of the 
proposal. Most commonly, however, success entails alteration of the proposal. When 
alteration occurs, the success can be measured by looking at the difference in quality and 
eligibility between the original proposal and the revised proposal. An indicator for quality is 
the amount of money available in total or per participant of the welfare state program, 
depending on what sort of program it concerns. The eligibility is measured by the number of 
people entitled to use the programs.  
 
5.3 Cuts to welfare state programs  
The concept of ‘cuts to welfare state programs’ is closely related to the concept of welfare 
state retrenchment. This second concept has been conceptualized in two different ways 
(Green-Pedersen, 2004, p. 7). The first of these focuses on retrenchment as cutbacks, while 
the second focuses on retrenchment as institutional change. As the first conceptualization 
clearly has more overlap with the concept of ‘cuts to welfare state programs’, this one is used 
in this thesis. This conceptualization has been provided by Green-Pedersen, who defined 
welfare state retrenchment as “a change in the scheme making it less attractive to the 
(potential) claimants” (Green-Pedersen, 2002, p. 58). This attractiveness is subsequently 
divided into the quality of the benefits and eligibility, meaning the strictness of the criteria 
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needed to be fulfilled to be entitled to the benefits. Whether or not a reform can be classified 
as a cut of a welfare state program has been operationalized by looking at these two factors. 
The quality is measured by the amount of money available in total for the program. The 
eligibility is measured by the number of people entitled to use the programs.  
 
5.4 Type of welfare state  
Determining the welfare state type of each country is determined in two ways. Firstly, the 
type of the entire welfare system is determined and secondly the specific program that the 
government is attempting to cut is established. This allows to see whether there are 
differences in the welfare state typology between these programs and the welfare state as a 
whole and if so, whether this influences social movements’ chances of success. In this thesis, 
the welfare systems and the individual programs are categorized on the basis of information 
about the programs from existing literature and government sources, following Korpi an 
Palme’s (1998) division.  
 
5.5 Openness of political systems  
This factor derives from Kitschelt’s (1986) theory of the impact of political systems on the 
success of social movements. Therefore, to accurately test whether his theory also applies to 
the impact of social movements, this thesis uses the same indicators Kitschelt employed in his 
study. The first of these is the number of political parties and factions in the political arena 
(Kitschelt, 1986, p. 63). This can be counted easily by looking at the website of the 
parliaments. The second factor Kitschelt (1986, p. 63) identified is the extent to which the 
parliament can formulate policies independently from the government. This can be recognized 
in the literature on the political systems of these countries. The third factor mentioned by him 
is the formulation of new policies as a result of new demands by interest groups. This factor 
closely relates to the strength of governments, so its measurement will be discussed in the 
next paragraph. The final factor Kitschelt (1986, p. 63) used is “patterns of intermediation 
between interest groups and the executive branch”. This factor is, however, too complicated 
and time consuming to correctly analyze. This cannot easily be determined through literature 
analysis. Therefore, the factor ‘Openness of Political Systems’ is solely analyzed on the basis 
of the other three factors mentioned by Kitschelt.  
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5.6 Strength of governments  
The strength of government is also a factor that was emphasized by Kitschelt (1986), so this 
thesis uses the indicators he utilized. Kitschelt employed three indicators to measure this 
factor. Firstly, the extent to which policy-making is centralized should be measured (Kitschelt, 
1986, p. 63). This can be identified by looking at the literature on the political systems of the 
countries. Secondly, the amount of control the government has over the economy is an 
important indicator (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 64). Although Kitschelt used a wide variety of sub-
indicators, using all would be a too time consuming  process for this thesis. Therefore, this 
thesis only uses the public sector’s share of the GDP, as this number can easily be compared 
between countries. The final factor described by Kitschelt is the independence and influence 
of the judiciary in the policy making process (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 64). This is investigated by 
looking at the literature on the political roles of the judiciary in the countries concerned.  
 
5.7 Directness of the cuts  
The directness of the proposed cuts is a rather vague concept, which is also not specified by 
the author who used the concept (Timonen, 2001). This thesis measures the directness of the 
cuts by looking at two indicators. The first is the number of years between the proposal and 
the implementation of the cuts. The second indicator for the directness is whether the cuts are 
implemented in different steps. These indicators can be measured by looking at the proposals 
in which the cuts are proposed. Sources for this include bills, coalition agreements and media 
sources.  
 
5.8 Disruptiveness of social movements  
The measurement of the disruptiveness of movements is very difficult, as the authors who 
have written about it (e.g. Vibe, 2011) have not defined it explicitly. In some cases, an 
indicator for the disruptiveness of the protests may be the number of strike days. However, 
this makes comparison difficult with cases in which no strikes occurred, but in which violence 
at protests had a disruptive effect. For these cases, the number of arrests can be a reliable 
indicator for disruptiveness. But this faces the same problem concerning comparability. 
Therefore, the financial damage as a result of the social movement is used as an indicator for 
the disruptiveness of the social movement. This may not cover all the disruption caused by the 
social movement, as not all disruption can be expressed in financial terms. However, this 
indicator does allow for comparison between the disruptive effect of strikes and riots. 
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Information about the financial damage is retrieved from government documents and media 
sources.  
 
5.9 Size of social movements  
This thesis measures the size of the social movements by looking at the number of people 
taking part in the protests and/or strikes at its peak. However, to allow for comparison 
between countries, two measures are used. Firstly, the absolute size of the movements is 
measured by looking at the total number of people taking part in the movement. This is done 
by looking at the existing literature and media sources. As estimates of the number of 
participants tend to differ between different sources, the lowest and highest estimates are used. 
Secondly, the relative size of the social movements is used. This is done by taking the 
absolute size of the social movements as a percentage of the total number of inhabitants of the 
country. This allows for comparison between the social movements in the different countries 
researched. 
 
5.10 Allies in the political elite  
The extent to which social movements have allies in the political elite is categorized in three 
dimensions. Firstly, it is necessary to identify whether there were members of the political 
elite that supported the movement. This thesis sees political parties with parliamentary 
representation, members of parliament and members of the government as members of the 
political elite. Researching whether such support existed is done by examining reactions to the 
movements of these people in the media, on their own websites and by looking at the existing 
literature. Secondly, this thesis identifies whether the support came from individual politicians, 
or smaller or larger political parties, in order to see how large the support in the political elite 
was. Thirdly, it is examined whether the movements had support within the governing 
coalition or only within the opposition.  
 
5.11 Public support  
To measure public support, polls of the support of political parties and politicians are used to 
examine whether political parties opposing the cuts have grown in support at the cost of pro-
cuts parties. Polls before the announcement of the cuts, polls after the announcement and polls 
after the protests are examined. The difference between these polls can be used as an indicator 
for the effect the social movement had on public the public support for their cause.  
Protecting the Welfare State  
16 
 
 
5.12 Other factors  
As mentioned in the theoretical framework, apart from the expectations based on the existing 
literature, there may also be other, previously unknown, factors expected that influence the 
impact of social movements resisting cuts to welfare state programs. When such important 
other factors are discovered during analysis of one case, the influence of this factor is 
analyzed in the other cases as well. A new influential factors that was discovered during the 
research is the ‘Type of Cuts’. This factor is analyzed by looking at what sector of the welfare 
states the cuts are implemented in and whether the cuts are implemented in a single sector or 
in multiple sectors as a large austerity plan. A second newly discovered factor concerns 
whether the cuts were mentioned in the election manifestos of the parties and/or politicians 
that announced them.   
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  6.  Cases  
This chapter describes the selected cases on the basis of the examined factors. This 
information is summarized in table 1, of which an extensive version (table 2) is included in 
the appendix.  
 
6.1 France 1995  
In November 1995, prime minister Juppé announced his plans to reform the welfare state to 
reduce the budget deficit (Assemblée Nationale, 1995). As part of the plans, the government 
would get the right to determine the maximum amount spent on health care (Assemblée 
Nationale, 1995, p. 12). This was a de facto cut, as the growth of expenses would become 
lower than without this ability (Sommer, 1997). Additionally, public sector workers would 
have to work 40 years instead of 37,5 years to earn a full pension (Assemblée Nationale, 1995, 
p. 11). Furthermore, Juppé announced that family allowances would be reformed as well. 
They would become subject to taxation (Assemblée Nationale, 1995, p. 11), would no longer 
be available for families with monthly incomes above 30,000 francs (Assemblée Nationale, 
1995, p. 32) and would not be adjusted to inflation in 1996 (Assemblée Nationale, 1995, p. 
15). These cuts were scheduled to be implemented in the near future, over the course of 1996 
and 1997 (Assemblée Nationale, 1995, p. 14). These plans were surprising, as president 
Chirac, who belonged to the same party as Juppé and had appointed him, had focused 
primarily on social justice and employment in his campaign (Chirac, 1995).   
 
In reaction to this ‘Plan Juppé’, two major unions (CGT and FO) called for strikes and 
protests. At its peak, five million workers took part in these strikes (Jefferys, 1996, p. 15) and 
the economy experienced 0.2% less growth that quarter than would have been expected 
without the strikes (INSEE, 2007, p. 17). This translates to nearly 800 million euros in today’s 
terms (OECD, 2018b). Therefore, the movement can be seen as highly disruptive. The social 
movement also had an effect on the polls, with Chirac and Juppé losing 4%-point and 6%-
point respectively between October and November (Kantar TNS, 2018a; 2018b). Political 
support for the movement was limited, as the socialist party was divided (Trat, 1996, p. 231), 
although it ultimately denounced the plan (Roman, Sintomer, Chalier, & Padis, 2015, p. 79). 
The communist party did support the movement (PCF, 1995), but had a weak power base 
(Trat, 1996, p. 231).  
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In response to the strikes, Juppé revoked his pension reform for public workers (Bonoli, 1997, 
p. 121). He was also unable to implement the reform that would allow him to penalize 
overspending on health care, because of lack of public support (Vail, 1999, p. 324-325). 
However, the government did obtain the right to impose spending limits. The social 
movement also failed in stopping the family allowance reform (Buchan, 1995). So, with 
respect to the pension reform, the strikes were successful. But with regard to the general 
policy of spending cuts and health care reform, the social movement was only partly able to 
stop the cuts. Nonetheless, it did strongly influence most of the policies it attempted to 
influence and can therefore be considered successful.   
 
The welfare system in France is considered to be a corporatist system (Korpi & Palme, 2003, 
p. 435). Its income- and employment-based special pensions system also fits this description 
(Bonoli, 1997, p. 117). The French political system is closed, as there were few factions 
represented in parliament (Assemblée Nationale, 2018), which are centripetally divided, while 
the executive dominated the parliament (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 65). The French government, 
however, was strong at the time (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 64). It was extremely centralized 
(Kuhlman, 2011) and public expenditure as a percentage of GDP was high (OECD, 2018a). 
This strength was only reduced by the powerful French judiciary (Stone, 1992).  
 
6.2 Ireland 2008  
During the presentation of the Irish government budget for 2009, it was announced the 
universal eligibility for people over 70 years for medical cards, that ensure basic medical costs 
(Health Service Executive, 2018), would be abolished (Lenihan 2008). Only singles with a 
weekly income of less than €240,30 and couples with a combined weekly income of €480,60 
would be entitled to one (Oireachtas, 2008a). As the reform was planned to be implemented 
within three months, it was an extremely direct cut (Lenihan, 2008, p. 10). This reform was 
quite unexpected, because the major government party Fianna Fáil had not mentioned the 
plans in its election manifesto (Fianna Fáil, 2007). Its junior coalition partner the Green Party 
even spoke of expanding medical card coverage (Green Party: Comhaontas Glas, 2007, p. 23), 
while only the small Progressive Democrats wanted to cut eligibility (Progressive Democrats, 
2007, p. 43).   
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In response to this plan, social movements announced protests, which brought 15.000 
pensioners together (Irish Times, 2008b). The entire opposition, as well as two independent 
Members of Parliament that used to be part of the government majority supported the social 
movement (Irish Times, 2008b). The protests were not disruptive, as they caused no economic 
damage, but the government coalition did lose 12%-point support in the polls as a result of the 
announcement (RTE, 2008). As a response to this public discontent and the announced protest, 
the government severely increased the thresholds for eligibility (Irish Times, 2008a) and in 
the definitive version of the reform anyone over 70 with a weekly income of less than €700 or 
€1400 together with his spouse remained eligible (Oireachtas, 2008b). Thus, the social 
movement was successful in altering the reform, although it was not completely revoked. 
 
The Irish welfare state is classified by Korpi and Palme (1998, p. 668) as a basic security 
model, and this corresponds with the universal character of the pre-reform medical cards 
system. The Irish political system can be characterized as fairly weak, due to the dominance 
of the executive over the legislature (Murphy, 2006, p. 440) and the concentration of seats in 
parliament in few parties (Oireachtas, 2018). The position of the government was reasonably 
strong, because of the high degree of centralization (Considine & Reidy, 2015, p. 120), 
although its economic strength (OECD, 2018a) and the political role of the judiciary 
(MacGuckian, 2005, p. 328) were average.  
 
6.3 United Kingdom 2011  
Following the presentation of the 2011-2012 UK budget, which contained a range of budget 
cuts to reduce the budget deficit, large protests emerged. The government planned to cut £95 
billion within 5 years in total, including many cuts to welfare state programs (Her Majesty’s 
Treasury, 2011). Although the implementation of the cuts was spread out over multiple years, 
the direct effect on people’s lives was still substantial, due to the height of the cuts.   
 
The union TUC organized a ‘March for the Alternative’ in London to protest the speed in 
which the deficit was reduced and the choice to do this primarily through budget cuts (TUC, 
2011). The number of participants was estimated to lie between 250.000 (BBC, 2011a) and 
400.000 persons (Guardian, 2011a). The march was supported by the Labour Party 
(Townsend, McVeigh, Doward & Sharrock, 2011) and the Green Party (Green Party of 
England and Wales, 2011).  
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During the protests, a few hundred protesters clashed with the police and damaged stores 
(Guardian, 2011b). The total economic damage of the protests can be estimated to be a couple 
hundred thousand pounds (BBC, 2011c; BBC, 2011d; Rawlinson, 2011). Thus, the protests 
can be seen as mildly disruptive. The political effect, however, was rather small, as the events 
only caused a 3%-point increase in the government’s disapproval level (YouGov & The Sun, 
2011b; YouGov & The Sun, 2011c). This was not surprising, as both coalition parties had 
announced deficit reduction through budget cuts in their election manifesto (Conservative 
Party, 2010, p. 7; Liberal Democrats, 2010, p. 97). The social movement was also unable to 
change the budget cuts (BBC, 2011b). So, the social movement was unsuccessful.   
 
The welfare system in the UK is considered to be a basic security system (Korpi & Palme, 
2003, p. 434). Its political system can be regarded as remarkably closed, because of its small 
amount of relevant parties (Cracknell, McGuinnes & Rhodes, 2011) and executive dominance 
over the legislature (Strohmeier, 2015, p. 307). The position of the government is strong, 
because of the high degree of centralization (Strohmeier, 2015, p. 309) and small political 
influence of the judiciary (Strohmeier, 2015, p. 311), even though public spending is only 
about average for an OECD-member (OECD, 2018a).  
 
6.4 Belgium 2014  
Immediately after the inauguration of the right wing Michel government in 2014 and the 
announcement of its austerity plans, Belgian unions called for strikes and protests against the 
announced budget cuts (Wouters et al., 2015). The coalition parties had agreed to cut social 
security by 2,9 billion euros (Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2014, p. 60). 
Furthermore, they planned to increase the retirement age from 65 to 67 in the long run 
(Michel, Peeters, De Wever & Rutten, 2014, p. 30). While the plans for austerity were clearly 
mentioned in the election manifestos of the coalition parties, this retirement age reform was 
not (N-VA, 2014; Open Vld, 2014, MR, 2014; CD&V, 2014). These budget cuts were 
implemented fairly directly, while the increase of the retirement age was planned to rise in 
steps over a period of 15 years (Michel et al., 2014, p. 30).   
 
Particularly the unions opposed these plans (ABVV, 2014; Leemans, 2014), as well as all the 
left wing parties in parliament (Decreus & Purnelle, 2014; Godefridi, 2014; PVDA-PTB, 
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2014; Vergauwen, 2014). Approximately 120,000 people took part in the strikes and 
demonstrations, although only 6.3% of these demonstrated were affiliated with a coalition 
party (Wouters et al., 2015). The protests and strikes were incredibly disruptive, causing 
between 480 and 600 million euros in economic damage (Standaard, 2014). Additionally, a 
small group of protesters turned violent and rioted against the police (Wouters et al., 2015). 
However, the loss of public support for the government was limited, with only about 2.5% 
decrease in support in Flanders and Walloon (La Libre, 2014).   
 
Prime minister Michel was unwilling to change the plans agreed to in the coalition agreement 
(HLN, 2014). He did call for negotiations with the unions and employers’ organizations. 
These talks only led to agreement concerning early retirement (Standaard, 2015), but it was 
already decided in the coalition agreement that unions would be involved in this (Michel et al. 
2014, p. 13). So the social movement was unable to stop or significantly alter the cuts to the 
welfare state programs.  
 
The Belgian welfare state can be qualified as a corporatist system (Korpi & Palme, 2003, p. 
435), as well as its pensions system (Keupers, 2009, p. 81). With respect to the openness of its 
political system, the country can be considered to be between open and closed. This is 
because, on the one hand, the Belgian parliament is highly fragmented (Belgische Kamer van 
Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2018), but on the other hand, it is dominated by the executive 
(Pilet, 2011). The position of the government is fairly weak, because of the high degree of 
decentralization (De Visscher & Laborderie, 2013) and the fact that the judiciary is 
particularly cautious with interfering in politics (Verougstraete, 2013, p. 93).  
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Table 1.*  
Description of the examined factors per case 
 
Factor 
 
France 
 
Ireland 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Belgium 
Successa  Yes Yes No No 
Type of cutsb Multiple reforms 
and general 
austerity 
Health care General austerity Pensions reform 
and general 
austerity 
Directness of cutsc Somewhat direct Extremely direct Somewhat direct Budget cuts 
somewhat direct, 
pension reform 
very indirect  
Sized (% of the 
population) 
5.000.000 (9%) 15.000 (0,3%) 250.000-400.000 
(0,4%-0,6%) 
120.000 (1%) 
Disruptivee  Yes No Somewhat Yes 
Allies in the 
oppositionf 
Some Many Many Many 
Allies in the 
governmentg 
None Some None None 
Public support 
effecth 
6% 12% 3% 2,8% 
Cuts mentioned in 
manifestoi 
No No Yes Cuts: Yes 
Pension Reform: 
No 
Type of welfare 
statej 
Corporatist Basic security Basic security Corporatist 
Openness of 
political systemk 
Closed Closed Closed Between open and 
closed 
Strength of 
governmentl 
Strong Strong Strong Weak 
Note. An extensive version of this table can be found in the appendix, which includes an elaborate argumentation for the classifications and 
the sources used. 
aSuccess: whether the social movement successfully stopped or altered the plans for the cuts. bDirectness of the cuts: how directly the cuts 
were implemented. dSize: number of participants at the peak of the movement, between parentheses as a percentage of the total 
population. eDisruptive: whether the social movement caused economic damage. fAllies in the opposition: number of political parties that 
supported the social movement, but were not part of the governing coalition. gAllies in the government: number of political parties and 
individual politicians that supported the social movement, and were part of the governing coalition. hPublic support effect: the percentage 
of support the government lost as a result of the social movement and the announced cuts. iCuts mentioned in manifesto: whether the 
cuts were in line with what the governing parties announced in their election manifestos. jType of welfare state: what type of welfare state 
the country had, following Korpi and Palme’s division. kOpenness of political system: how open the political system was, following the 
classification of Kitschelt. lStrenght of the government: how strong the government’s position was, following the classification of Kitschelt. 
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   7.  Analysis  
 
This chapter examines whether the findings in the examined cases correspond with the 
theoretical expectation based on the existing literature. Firstly, the expectations concerning 
political opportunity structures will be examined, which include institutional factors and 
factors related to the characteristics of the cuts. Secondly, the theoretical expectations 
regarding the characteristics of the social movements themselves will be examined.  
 
7.1 Political opportunity structures  
This part of the chapter analyzes the influence of political opportunity structures on the 
successes and failures of the social movements in the four examined cases. First of all, 
institutional factors will be discussed. Thereafter, the impact of the characteristics of the cuts 
will be considered.  
 
7.1.1 Institutional factors  
One of the potentially influential political opportunity structures is the type of welfare state 
the different countries had, as described by Korpi and Palme (1998). Korpi and Palme’s (2003) 
expectation was that welfare state retrenchment is easier to implement in basic security 
systems than in corporatist systems. However, in this thesis, of the two successful social 
movements, the French one happened in a corporatist system and the Irish one in a basic 
security system. Furthermore, the unsuccessful social movements were also split in a 
corporatist and a basic security system. This division was, however, not entirely random, as 
Korpi and Palme’s typologies played a role in the case selection. Still, the lack of public 
discontent in Belgium and the enormous discontent in Ireland are not in line with Korpi and 
Palme’s expectation. They expected that public support for reform is substantially influenced 
by the welfare state type, because middle class dependency of welfare state programs differs 
between these types (Korpi and Palme, 2003, p. 432). This pattern cannot be recognized in the 
examined cases. Therefore, it seems the type of welfare state in which anti welfare state-cuts 
movements operate has little impact on their chances of success.   
 
Another expectation was that social movements have the highest chances of success in states 
with an open political system and a strong government (Kitschelt, 1986). It is difficult to 
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conclude anything about this expectation on the basis of this study, as the variation on these 
factors was very small between the cases. Three of the examined cases (France, Ireland and 
the UK) had closed systems but strong governments, while Belgium was unclear on both 
factors. Therefore, it seems open political systems are not necessary for social movements 
resisting cuts to welfare state programs to succeed. It also appears that strong governments are 
no guarantee for their success. However, it must be said that the examined cases provide little 
insight into this issue.   
 
7.1.2 Characteristics of the cuts  
Apart from these institutional factors, political opportunity structures for social movements 
are also influenced by the nature of the cuts themselves. One expectation was that social 
movements resisting cuts would be more successful when the proposed cuts were more direct 
(Timonen, 2001). This pattern can be recognized to a certain extent in the researched cases. 
The unsuccessful French public sector pensions reform was scheduled to be implemented 
within two years, whereas the successful increase of the Belgian retirement age was 
implemented in steps over a period of 15 years. The Irish medical card reform, in which social 
movements were successful, was very directly implemented, within a few months, as opposed 
to the British cuts, which were primarily based on budget freezing over several years. 
Therefore, Timonen’s theory is confirmed.   
 
A factor that was not mentioned in the previous literature was the influence of the nature of 
the cuts on the chances of the social movements opposing them. By comparing the four cases 
in this thesis, it appears that social movements are more likely to be successful in stopping or 
altering individual reforms than major reform programs, particularly if those are directed at 
decreasing budget deficits. In the Irish and French cases, the eventually changed proposals 
were part of a larger austerity program. It would have been very difficult to pressure the 
government in abandoning the entire program. However, the public anger was primarily 
directed at respectively the specific medical cards reform and the public pensions reform, 
which could be altered without abandoning austerity. Therefore, the social movements could 
be successful. The Belgian and British protests were more directed at the general policy of 
austerity, which made success extremely difficult.   
 
 
Protecting the Welfare State  
25 
 
A final factor that influenced the success of the movements was whether the cuts were 
announced before the elections. In the French and Irish cases, the reforms differed 
substantially from the policies proposed during the election campaign, which increased public 
discontent. The British austerity plans were, however, part of the coalition parties manifestos 
and therefore had more democratic legitimacy. The Belgian case is more difficult to assess, as 
austerity measures were part of the coalition parties’ manifestos, but the pension reform itself 
was not. Still, the general trend is that social movements resisting welfare state cuts that were 
part of election manifestos tend to have smaller chances of success.   
 
7.2 Social movement characteristics  
There were several theoretical expectations about the relationship between characteristics of 
the social movements and their chances of success as well. Among these is Vibe’s (2011, p. 
93) claim that larger and more disruptive social movements have higher chances of success. 
The data presented in this thesis have mixed implications for this claim. In the French case, 
the disruptive capability and enormous size of the strikes seems to have been decisive in its 
success, as many other factors were less favorable for the movement. However, the Belgian 
protest movement, which was more disruptive, but of a more modest size, was unsuccessful. 
Furthermore, the Irish seniors protest was neither large in size, nor disruptive. This proves 
large size and disruptive capability are not necessary for a protest to succeed. It can however 
increase chances of success under certain circumstances, when the disruption and size are 
very large, as was the case in France. But when its size is smaller, as in Belgium, the 
government can more easily ignore it. The chances of success of the Belgian and British cases 
were also decreased by the occurrence of violence. This gave the governments the opportunity 
to emphasize the violence, while shifting attention away from the cuts.   
 
The success of the Irish social movement against the medical cards reform originated for a 
large part from its ability to shift public opinion about the government parties, who lost 12%-
point in the polls. This public support effect also occurred to a lesser extent in France, where 
the prime minister’s approval rating dropped 6%-point. This effect was only about 3%-point 
in Belgium and the UK, which suggests that changes in public opinion play a large role in the 
chances of success of an anti-cuts social movement.   
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With regard to Tarrow’s (1993, p. 599) argument that allies in the political elite are important 
for the success of social movements, this appears to be limited with respect to social 
movement resisting cuts to welfare state programs. Both unsuccessful social movements had 
the support of the majority of the opposition, while the social movement in France had only 
weak support from political parties. The Irish social movement did have a lot of support, from 
the opposition and dissident members of parliament of coalition parties. However, these 
political allies did not have a majority, so the movement remained dependent on the 
government majority. This support of the opposition did however create an outlet for popular 
discontent, which made the 12%-point shift in the polls a clear signal against the medical 
cards reform. This increased pressure on the government, which culminated in the social 
movement’s success. Thus, the support of political parties does not in itself increase the 
chances of success for social movements resisting welfare state cuts. But, it does create an 
opportunity for the people to pressure the government by expressing their discontent with the 
cuts through shifting support from coalition parties to anti-cuts opposition parties.  
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   8.  Conclusion  
This chapter will attempt to answer the research question on the basis of the examined data. 
This research was conducted to find an answer to the following research question:  
 
  “What determines whether social movements resisting cuts to welfare state  
 programs are successful?”  
 
The four cases show that some factors that were expected to be influential for this success 
were in fact influential, whereas others were not. They also indicate that some previously 
unmentioned factors are important. This chapter will firstly conclude which factors were 
influential and secondly which factors were not influential. Thereafter, the factors will be 
reviewed for which this research could not provide a definitive conclusion. Finally, some 
shortcomings of this thesis and suggestions for further research will be discussed.  
 
8.1 Influential factors  
Several factors arose from the examined data that tend to increase the chances of social 
movements resisting cuts to welfare state programs. The most important of these is the ability 
to change public opinion towards the government. If a social movement succeeds in 
substantially lowering a government’s popularity, its chances of success rise drastically. This 
effect can be supported by strong support of opposition parties for the movement. This creates 
a way to express popular discontent, by shifting support from government parties to these 
opposition parties in the polls.   
 
A second influential factor concerns the nature of the cuts. Social movements focusing on 
specific cuts have higher chances of success than those that try to stop the general policy of 
austerity, because that requires a major policy shift. Further, governments are less likely to 
yield to the social movements demands when the opposed policies or the general nature of 
these policies are in line with what they promised in their election campaign. When this is the 
case, the policies have more legitimacy and public opinion is less likely to shift, as the 
announcement of the new reforms is less surprising. A fourth important factor concerns the 
directness with which the cuts are implemented. When cuts are announced a few months 
before the scheduled implementation, it tends to cause more public unrest than when they are 
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planned to occur in multiple years. This in turn increases the chances of success of the social 
movements resisting them.   
 
The size and disruptive capability of the social movements can also influence their chances of 
success. But, this influence is less clear cut. An increase in size and disruptive capability does 
not necessarily increase the chance of success. But when a certain threshold of size and 
disruptiveness is passed, governments are much more willing to do concessions to the 
movements. However, it is difficult to precisely determine where this threshold lies. Finally, 
violence during protests decreases its chances of success, as governments then can more 
easily dismiss the protests as unacceptable behavior.  
 
8.2 The influence of welfare state types  
The data did not show any influence of the type of welfare state of countries on the chances of 
success of social movements resisting cuts to welfare state programs. Although the cases were 
divided into two different types of welfare states, based on the typology of Korpi and Palme 
(1998), the data showed no clear link between this factor and social movement success. This 
lack of a link may be explained by the fact their typology played a role in the case selection. 
However, the difference in public support they expected between the different types was not 
visible in the data. Thus, it appears that welfare state types have little influence on the chances 
of success of social movements resisting cuts to welfare state programs.  
 
8.3 Undecided factors  
The impact of the openness of a country’s political system and the strength of its government 
on the chances of success of social movement, that Kitschelt (1986) showed to be substantial 
for anti-nuclear movements, cannot be confirmed for anti welfare state cuts movements on the 
basis of this study. Because of small variation between the cases on these factors, no link 
could be discovered. The only conclusion that can be derived from the data is that success is 
possible, even when the country’s political system is closed according Kitschelt’s standards. 
 
8.4 Societal and scientific relevance  
This thesis contributes to the scientific knowledge about the relationship between social 
movements and welfare state reforms. It provides a more complete analysis of the factors that 
are influential for the chances of success of social movements. This analysis also has a 
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societal impact. Firstly, it can help social movements in their efforts. And secondly, it gives 
more insight in the process through which social movements influence the policymaking, 
which increases the transparency of the political process.   
 
8.5 Suggestions for further research  
The research design of this study provides the opportunity to conduct an explorative research 
on a relatively little researched topic, which allows it to identify multiple factors that 
influence the success of social movement resisting welfare state cuts. However, to truly 
discover the extent to which this influence occurs, it would be necessary to research these 
relationships through a large-N quantitative analysis. Furthermore, the limited number of 
cases in this study prevented it from discovering the influences of the openness of political 
systems and the strength of governments on the chances of success of social movements 
resisting welfare state cuts. This may be discovered –or discovered not to exist– through a 
most similar systems design, where cases only differ on these factors.  Finally, the use of 
many variables complicated the analysis of causal relationships. In depth research of specific 
variables may solve this problem.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 2  
Description of the examined factors per case – extended version 
Factor France Ireland United Kingdom Belgium 
Success of social 
movements 
The strikes and protests were 
organized in resistance of the 
‘Juppé plan’. This plan consisted 
of multiple reforms, 
centralizations and cutbacks of 
welfare state programs. The 
most important cuts concerned 
the pensions system for public 
sector workers, health care 
spending and family allowances. 
In the announcement of the 
Juppé plan, Juppé stated the 
required number of years of 
employment for a pensions 
would be increased from 37.5 to 
40 for public sector workers 
(Assemblée Nationale, 1995, p. 
11). As a result of the protests, 
this part of the plan was 
abandoned completely (Bonoli, 
1997, p. 121). With respect to 
the health care reforms, these 
were implemented for the most 
part (Vail, 1999, p. 316). 
However, Juppé had to abandon 
The protests organized by the 
social movements were 
directed at the announced cuts 
of medical card eligibility for 
people over 70 years old. In 
the original proposal, only 
seniors with a weekly income 
of less than €240,30 (as a 
single) or €480,60 (as a 
couple) would be entitled to a 
full medical card (Oireachtas, 
2008a). After the protests had 
been announced, the 
government revised the reform 
dramatically (Irish Times, 
2008a). In the definitive 
Health Act by which the 
reform was made official, 
these thresholds were 
increased to €700 and €1400 a 
week respectively (Oireachtas, 
2008b, p. 5). According to the 
government, this would mean 
95% of seniors would remain 
entitled to a full medical card 
The social movement that 
organized the protest march, 
the union TUC, tried to oppose 
the grave effective cuts 
announced by the coalition 
government. It argued it was 
not necessary to solve to 
government deficit within four 
years (TUC, 2011). It also 
opposed the choice to do this 
primarily through budget cuts, 
as opposed to increasing taxes. 
However, the government 
responded it would not change 
its policies (BBC, 2011b). In 
conclusion, the social 
movement was unsuccessful as 
the plans it opposed were not 
revoked or altered by the 
government. 
The protests against the cuts by 
the Belgian federal government 
were directed at the plans 
announced in the Belgian 
coalition agreement. The 
unions behind the strikes and 
protests attempted to resist cuts 
to various programs, ranging 
from the increase of the 
retirement age to reduction of 
unemployment benefits 
(ABVV, 2014) and the general 
neoliberal character of the 
reforms (Leemans, 2014). In 
reaction to the protests, prime 
minister Michel stated that 
strong alterations to the plans 
were impossible, because they 
were agreed to in the coalition 
agreement (HLN, 2014). He 
did however call for the “social 
partners” (unions and 
employers’ organizations) to 
get around the table to 
negotiate. Thus, with respect to 
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the accompanying power to 
impose penalties for exceeding 
the spending limits (Vail, 1999, 
p. 324-325). The family 
allowances reform, as well as 
the general policy of reducing 
welfare spending were 
implemented (Buchan, 1995). 
Therefore, the amount of 
success of the social movement 
differs with respect to different 
reform proposals. With regard to 
the general policy of welfare 
state retrenchment, the social 
movement was partly 
successful, as the cuts were 
implemented, but less strongly 
than originally planned. This is 
also the case for the health care 
reform. Concerning family 
allowances, the social 
movement has clearly failed to 
stop the reform. However, with 
respect to pensions reform, the 
social movement can be 
considered to be a clear success, 
as this measure was fully 
abandoned. 
(Martha, 2014). However, the 
reform still revoked the 
universal aspect of the medical 
cards program and the 
government did not meet the 
social movement’s demand of 
total abandonment of the 
reform. Nonetheless, the social 
movement can be considered 
to be a clear success.  
the recognition of the 
representing function of the 
unions, this has clearly been 
achieved. However, concerning 
new advantages for the group 
they represent, in this case 
workers, the unions were only 
able to influence the reforms of 
early pensions (Standaard, 
2015). However, the governing 
coalition already announced it 
would involve the social 
partners in the completion of 
this reform before the protests 
(Michel, Peeters, De Wever & 
Rutten, 2014, p. 13). Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the 
social movements did not 
succeed in stopping the welfare 
state cuts they opposed. 
Cuts to welfare 
state programs 
On the 15th of November 1995, 
prime minister Alain Juppé 
announced his plans for social 
security reform. He stated these 
would contain four major 
reforms (Assemblée Nationale, 
1995, p. 11). Firstly, he 
Before the announced reform, 
every person above 70 was 
entitled to a full medical card. 
This card covers basic medical 
costs, such as doctor’s 
appointments, medication and 
dental checks (Health Service 
In the 2011 UK budget, the 
government announced budget 
cuts on a number of welfare 
state programs. The education 
budget was scheduled to 
decrease by £2,3 billion (Her 
Majesty’s Treasury, 2011, p. 
The 2014 Belgian coalition 
agreement contained multiple 
cuts to welfare state programs. 
Most importantly, it announced 
the increase of the retirement 
age from 65 to 67 in the long 
run (Michel et al., 2014, p. 30). 
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announced the introduction of a 
universal health insurance, by 
combining the different existing 
programs. Furthermore, the 
change of the level of health 
care expenses would be 
determined by the government 
(Assemblée Nationale, 1995, p. 
12). This effectively worked as a 
cut, because it decreases the 
amount of money otherwise 
spent on health care (Sommer, 
1997). The second reform 
concerned the special pensions 
for public sector employees. 
Juppé proposed to lengthen the 
required contribution period 
from 37,5 years to 40 years 
(Assemblée Nationale, 1995, p. 
11). This is a clear case of a cut 
of a welfare state program, as 
this reduces the number of 
people eligible to the program. 
Thirdly, the family allowances 
system would be reformed. 
These family allowances would 
become subjected to taxation 
(Assemblée Nationale, 1995, p. 
11). Furthermore, the family 
allowances would become 
means-tested and families with 
an income over 30,000 francs 
per month would lose eligibility 
(Assemblée Nationale, 1995, p. 
32). The allowances would also 
Executive, 2018). In the initial 
proposal, the government 
proposed to abolish universal 
entitlement to over 70’s 
(Lenihan, 2008). Instead, only 
seniors with a weekly income 
of maximum €240,30 or a 
combined couples income of 
€480,60 or less would get a 
full medical card (Oireachtas, 
2008a). Thus, the number of 
people eligible for the program 
was cut dramatically. 
Therefore, the proposed 
reform can be qualified as a 
cut of a welfare state program.  
48). The government had 
already announced welfare cuts 
of £7 billion by 2015, although 
only £320 million of this was 
scheduled to be implemented in 
2011-2012 (Her Majesty’s 
Treasury, 2010, p. 12). These 
cuts included caps on the total 
amount of benefits of workless 
households and the exclusion 
of high earning families from 
child benefits. However, the 
effective cuts were a lot higher, 
as many budgets were not 
increased (enough) to keep up 
with inflation. The effective 
level of spending cuts was 
expected to be £95 billion by 
2016, starting with 22 billion in 
the period 2010-2012, although 
these cuts also contained non-
welfare state cuts (Her 
Majesty’s Treasury, 2011, p. 
10). Nonetheless, there 
definitely were cuts to welfare 
state programs, which occurred 
in different forms. Partly 
through reforms that reduced 
eligibility, partly through 
nominal reductions in funding 
and mostly through budget 
freezing. 
This obviously reduced the 
eligibility of the state pensions 
program, because 65- and 66-
year olds will no longer be 
eligible to the program. 
Further, the social security 
expenses were reduced by 1,4 
billion euros in 2015, including 
a 804 million euro cut in health 
expenses (Belgische Kamer 
van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 
2014, p. 15-16). This social 
security cut was scheduled to 
increase to 2,9 billion euros in 
2018 (Belgische Kamer van 
Volksvertegenwoordigers, 
2014, p. 60). These budget cuts 
can be classified as a cut of 
welfare state programs, 
because it decreases the 
amount of money available for 
these programs. 
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be frozen in 1996 (Assemblée 
Nationale, 1995, p. 15). This is 
cut of a welfare state program as 
the number of people eligible 
would decrease and the people 
eligible would receive a lower 
amount, due to the introduction 
of taxation and the freezing of 
the allowances. The fourth 
reform consisted of shifting the 
financing of the social security 
system from labour based 
taxation to broader bases of 
taxation (Assemblée Nationale, 
1995, p. 11-12). This is, 
however, not a cut in itself. 
Directness of the 
cuts 
The reforms regarding health 
care were scheduled to be 
implemented over the course of 
1996 and 1997 (Assemblée 
Nationale, 1995, p. 15). The 
family allowance reforms were 
planned quite directly, with the 
freezing starting in 1996 
(Assemblée Nationale, 1995, p. 
15) and the taxation in 1997 
(Assemblée Nationale, 1995, p. 
11). Juppé did not specify when 
he was going to implement the 
pensions reform, but did state 
the deficit reducing measure 
would be implemented during 
1996 and 1997 (Assemblée 
Nationale, 1995, p. 14). So, the 
plans were scheduled to be 
The cut of the medical cards 
program was implemented 
extremely directly. While 
announced on October 14th, it 
was scheduled to come into 
force January first 2009 
(Lenihan, 2008, p. 10). The 
measure was not framed to be 
something other than a cut. 
The cuts were fairly directly 
implemented. Although the 
effective spending cuts were 
implemented in steps of an 
average of £18 billion per year, 
this still had a reasonably direct 
effect. The cuts announced in 
the 2011 budget on the 23th of 
March were implemented 
starting April first.  
The cuts to social security were 
implemented directly. 
However, the cuts were built 
up to 2.9 billion euros within 3 
years (Belgische Kamer van 
Volksvertegenwoordigers, 
2014, p. 60). Only about half of 
this was cut in the first year 
(Belgische Kamer van 
Volksvertegenwoordigers, 
2014, p. 16). The government 
did not attempt to frame the 
cuts as something else, but 
admitted they were cuts 
(Belgische Kamer van 
Volksvertegenwoordigers, 
2014). So, these budget cuts 
were fairly direct. However, 
the pensions reform was far 
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implemented quite directly. less direct, as the retirement 
age was scheduled to rise by 1 
year in 2025 and another year 
in 2030 (Michel et al., 2014, p. 
30). 
Size of social 
movements 
The social movement of 1995 
had an enormous size. At its 
peak, 5 million workers took 
part in the strikes and between 1 
and 2.5 million took part in 
demonstrations (Jefferys, 1996, 
p. 15). This means about 9% of 
the French population took part 
in the strike. 
About 15,000 pensioners 
protested against the medical 
cards reform (Irish Times, 
2008b). This was only about 
0.3% of the entire Irish 
population. 
Estimates of the number of 
participants ranged from 
250,000 (BBC, 2011a) to 
400,000 (Guardian, 2011a) 
protesters. This was between 
0.4% and 0.6% of the British 
population. 
There was near consensus on 
the number of protesters in the 
largest protests (Wouters, 
Walgrave, Ketelaars & Eggert, 
2015). This was estimated to be 
around 120,000. This is little 
over 1% of the Belgian 
population. 
Disruptiveness 
of social 
movements 
The strikes had a large economic 
impact on society. According to 
the ‘Institut national de la 
statistique et des études 
économiques’, the strikes 
decreased GDP in the fourth 
quarter of 1995 by about 0.2% 
(INSEE, 2007, p. 17). 
Considering the fact that 
quarterly GDP was around 393 
billion euros in that quarter 
(converted to current price 
levels) (OECD, 2018b), this 
made the economic damage 
about 786 million euros. This is 
about 14 euros per inhabitant. 
Thus, the social movement was 
very disruptive. 
There were no reports of 
disruptiveness of the 
movement. This is not 
surprising, as pensioners 
cannot strike and are not likely 
to riot. 
During the protests, a small 
minority of a few hundred 
protesters turned violent and 
damaged stores and clashed 
with the police (Guardian, 
2011b). The cleanup afterwards 
was estimated to cost tens of 
thousands of pounds (BBC, 
2011c). Further, a group of 
protesters occupied the store 
Fortnum & Mason, causing 
£71,000 in damage and lost 
profits (Rawlinson, 2011). 
Combined with the deployment 
of 4500 police officers (BBC, 
2011d), the economic costs of 
the protests can be estimated to 
be multiple hundreds of 
thousands pounds. 
Employers organizations 
estimated the financial damage 
of the strikes to be between 480 
and 600 million euros 
(Standaard, 2014). This is 
between 44 and 55 euros per 
inhabitant. Therefore, the 
social movement can be 
qualified as very disruptive. 
Allies in the 
political elite 
The social movement had little 
support in the political elite. The 
The social movement had 
many political allies. All the 
The protests were supported by 
the Labour Party and its leader 
Many opposition parties 
supported the protests and 
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socialist party was divided, as 
some of its leaders originally 
supported parts of the plan (Trat, 
1996, p. 231). It did, however, 
eventually denounce the plan 
after internal debate (Roman, 
Sintomer, Chalier, & Padis, 
2015, p. 79). The communist 
party supported the movement 
(PCF, 1995), but was not able to 
contribute much to it as its 
power had severely declined 
(Trat, 1996, p. 231). Thus, the 
social movement had few strong 
allies in the political elite. 
opposition parties supported 
the movement, as well as two 
independent members of 
parliament who previously 
supported the coalition (Irish 
Times, 2008b). Thus, the 
social movement had broad 
support outside the coalition 
and even some support within. 
Ed Miliband (Townsend, 
McVeigh, Doward & Sharrock, 
2011). Further support came 
from smaller parties, like the 
Green Party (Green Party of 
England and Wales, 2011). 
strikes. These include the small 
communist PVDA-PTB 
(PVDA-PTB, 2014), the social 
democratic SP.a (Decreus & 
Purnelle, 2014) and PS 
(Godefridi, 2014) and the green 
parties Ecolo and Groen 
(Vergauwen, 2014). 
Public support The popularity level of president 
Chirac fell slightly from 41% in 
October 1995, before the strikes, 
to 37% during the strikes, but 
recovered afterwards to 39% 
(Kantar TNS, 2018a). The same 
movement can be seen for prime 
minister Juppé. His popularity 
dropped from 39% to 33% 
between October and 
November, but recovered to 
37% by December (Kantar TNS, 
2018b). So, the effect of the 
social movement on public 
opinion seems to have been 
quite influential, although the 
popularity levels quickly 
restored after the protests. 
There was a large shift in the 
polls after the announcement 
of the medical card reform. In 
the October 2008 poll, the 
coalition lost 12%-point 
support to the anti-reform 
opposition (RTE, 2008). 
Before the announcement of 
the 2011 budget, the 
percentage of the population 
that disapproved the 
government’s record was 54% 
(YouGov & The Sun, 2011a, p. 
1). After the announcement, 
this percentage changed little to 
52% (YouGov & The Sun, 
2011b, p. 1). After the protests 
on the 26th of march, this 
number rose slightly to 55% 
(YouGov & The Sun, 2011c, p. 
1). However, these differences 
small. 
The coalition parties did not 
lose a lot of support as a result 
of the protests. Between the 
September and December 
polls, the coalition parties 
together only lost 2.6%-point 
in Flanders and 2.7%-point in 
Walloon (La Libre, 2014).  
Only in Brussels their loss 
(4.2%-point) was worth 
mentioning. This makes the 
effect for Belgium as a whole a 
loss of 2.8%-point. 
Type of welfare 
state 
The French welfare state is 
classified by Korpi and 
Before the 2008 reform, 
medical cards were universally 
Korpi and Palme (2003, p. 434) 
classified the British welfare 
The general welfare system in 
Belgium is considered to be a 
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Palme (2003, p. 435) as a 
corporatist system. The 
pensions system subject to 
reform in the Juppé plan 
was based on the number 
of employed years and the 
earned income (Bonoli, 
1997, p. 117). This 
corresponds with the 
classification of 
corporatism. 
available for all Irish seniors 
over 70. Therefore, this 
program has the most 
similarities with Korpi and 
Palme’s (1998, p. 668) basic 
security model. This 
corresponds with their claim 
that Ireland’s overall system is 
a basic security model (Korpi 
and Palme, 2003, p. 442). 
state as a basic security system. 
As the budget cuts were 
implemented in many different 
programs, there is no particular 
welfare state program to 
examine. 
corporatist system (Korpi & 
Palme, 2003, p. 435). The most 
important subject of the 
protests, the pension system, is 
earnings-related (Keupers, 
2009, p. 81). Therefore, this 
program can also be classified 
as corporatist. 
Openness of 
political systems 
In the tenth legislature, which 
presided during the protests, 
there were five factions in 
parliament (Assemblée 
Nationale, 2018). However, the 
party system was very 
centripetal, which closed up the 
system (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 65). 
Further, Kitschelt (1986, p. 65) 
described the legislature as weak 
and being dominated by the 
executive. Therefore, the French 
system can be described as 
closed. 
Before the medical cards 
protests, there were six parties 
represented in the lower house 
of the Irish parliament, along 
with five independent 
representatives (Oireachtas, 
2018). Although the number of 
factions appears to be quite 
large, 77% of the seats were 
held by only two parties. 
Furthermore, the executive is 
very dominant over the 
parliament (Murphy, 2006, p. 
440). Thus, the Irish political 
system was fairly closed. 
In the 2010 House of 
Commons election, 10 parties 
and 1 independent won seats 
(Cracknell, McGuinnes & 
Rhodes, 2011, p. 1). However, 
as Sinn Féin never occupies 
their seats, the effective 
number of political faction 
drops to 10. Furthermore, 7 of 
the remaining parties won less 
than 5% of the seats combined 
(Cracknell, McGuinnes & 
Rhodes, 2011, p. 5). Therefore, 
the number of relevant parties 
is only three. Strohmeier (2015, 
p. 307) showed the executive is 
still dominant over the 
legislature, although this was a 
little bit less the case during the 
coalition government. 
Furthermore, the high amount 
of fusion of powers in the 
British political system 
strengthens this executive 
At the time of the protests, 
there technically were 13 
parties represented in the 
Belgian lower house, forming 
12 fractions together 
(Belgische Kamer van 
Volksvertegenwoordigers, 
2018). However, due to the fact 
that most parties only compete 
in one region, we can identify 
10 political factions. With 
regard to the position of the 
Belgian federal parliament, this 
is widely viewed as being 
dominated by the executive 
(Pilet, 2011). So, following 
Kitschelt’s (1986) indicators, 
Belgium seems to be in 
between open and closed, as 
the large number of political 
parties increases openness, but 
the weak position of its 
parliament decreases it. 
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dominance, as the leaders of 
the government and the 
parliamentary fractions of the 
governing parties are the same 
persons. So, with its small 
effective number of parties and 
executive dominance over the 
legislature, the British political 
system can be seen as closed. 
Strength of 
governments 
Kitschelt (1986, p. 64) classified 
the French government as 
strong. France’s political system 
historically was very 
centralized, but this has changed 
in the last decades (Kuhlman, 
2011). However, this 
decentralization primarily took 
place in 2003, which is long 
after the examined social 
movement. Therefore, at the 
time of the protests, the system 
could still be viewed as highly 
centralized. Furthermore, public 
spending as a percentage of 
GDP was very high with 54.2% 
(OECD, 2018a). With respect to 
the role of the judiciary in 
decision making, Stone (1992) 
considered this to be quite large. 
Nonetheless, the French 
government carries most 
characteristics of a strong 
government. 
The government in Ireland is 
very centralized, as lower 
governments have limited 
powers (Considine & Reidy, 
2015, p. 120). Public spending 
was average for an OECD-
member, at 41.8% of GDP 
(OECD, 2018a). The Irish 
judiciary does have a number 
of ways to influence decision-
making, but typically chooses 
to refrain from doing so 
(MacGuckian, 2005, p. 328). 
Therefore, the Irish 
government be classified as 
fairly strong. 
While the British political 
system traditionally was 
extraordinarily centralized, this 
has decreased a little since 
1998 (Strohmeier, 2015, p. 
309). Nevertheless, it can still 
be classified as fairly 
centralized. Public spending in 
2011 was 46.2% of GDP, 
which is in the middle-range of 
OECD countries (OECD, 
2018a). The judiciary has 
almost no influence in political 
decision-making (Strohmeier, 
2015, p. 311). Thus, the British 
government can be classified as 
strong. 
Belgium’s decision-making 
process is extremely 
decentralized (De Visscher & 
Laborderie, 2013). Many 
policies are determined by 
either the regions, provinces or 
cultural communities. On the 
other hand, public spending as 
a percentage of GDP was very 
high with 55.2% (OECD, 
2018a). However, lower 
governments take up a large 
part of this number. The 
judiciary is independent in 
Belgium, but has been cautious 
in influencing political 
decisions (Verougstraete, 2013, 
p. 93). Thus, the Belgian 
government can be 
characterized as fairly weak. 
Other factors The ‘Juppé plan’ was surprising, 
as Chirac campaigned on a 
The social movement had the 
advantage that the proposal 
A clear problem for the social 
movement was that the plan of 
The protest movement had the 
difficulty that austerity had 
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platform of social justice 
(Chirac, 1995). Chirac proposed 
to tackle the deficits by 
improving efficiency and 
reducing unemployment. The 
cuts on pensions and health care 
were not mentioned in his 
manifesto. This difference 
between his election promises 
and the Juppé plan weakened its 
legitimacy.  
was surprising, as it was not 
mentioned in the major 
coalition parties’ election 
manifestos (Fianna Fáil, 2007; 
Green Party: Comhaontas 
Glas, 2007). Only the very 
small (2 seats) Progressive 
Democrats vaguely mentioned 
medical cards eligibility 
reform (Progressive 
Democrats, 2007, p. 43). The 
Green Party (Green Party: 
Comhaontas Glas, 2007, p. 23) 
in fact said it wanted to expand 
the medical cards program. 
Another distinguishing factor 
of this social movement from 
the other cases is that this 
movement focused on a single 
small reform. Therefore, the 
government could more easily 
meet their demands. 
reducing the deficit by cutting 
spending was announced in the 
election manifestos of both 
coalition partners 
(Conservative Party, 2010, p. 
7; Liberal Democrats, 2010, p. 
97). 
been announced in all coalition 
parties’ manifestos (N-VA, 
2014; Open Vld, 2014, MR, 
2014; CD&V, 2014). However, 
the increase of the retirement 
age was not announced. The N-
VA, Open Vld and CD&V 
actually explicitly said it would 
not be increased (CD&V, 2014, 
p. 97; N-VA, 2014, p. 11; Open 
Vld, 2014, p. 12). Another 
factor that may have influenced 
the lack of success of the social 
movement is the fact that only 
6.3% of the protesters 
supported one of the parties in 
the coalition (Wouters et al., 
2015).  
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